Why we shouldn't push for a Pakistani offensive in North Waziristan

Afghan President Hamid Karzai with President Obama at the White House.

The last presidential address made clearthat all U.S. troops "surged" intoAfghanistan in 2009 will be withdrawnby next summer. Yet President Obama wasequally clear about something else: Pakistanmust crack down more forcefully on extremismwithin its borders.

"So long as I am President, the United Stateswill never tolerate a safe haven for those whoaim to kill us," Obama said. Translation: Pakistanneeds to launch an offensive inside NorthWaziristan.

Taliban fighters in Wana, South Waziristan.

North Waziristan is a hotbed of militancy, alaunching pad for attacks on American forcesin Afghanistan -- and the only tribal area not tohave experienced an intervention by the PakistaniArmy. Taking aim at the North Waziristansanctuary, Washington believes, wouldseverely degrade the capacities of militantswho target U.S. troops in eastern Afghanistan,where a large component of remaining Americansoldiers will focus their efforts.

A Pakistani operation in North Waziristanmay well make the job of U.S. forces inAfghanistan easier. However, it would also bea strategic mistake, because it would imperilcritical U.S. interests in Pakistan that far outweighthose in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani Army offers a range of reasonsto explain its inaction in North Waziristan,from lack of capacity to public opinion.The chief reason, however, is strategic: Itserves as a refuge for the Haqqani networkand Afghan Taliban, which the Pakistani militaryand intelligence agencies regard asstrategic assets and hence are careful not toalienate.

Consequently, while the Pakistani Talibanand several other indigenous outfits have declaredwar on the Pakistani state, the Haqqaninetwork and Afghan Taliban (which are fixatedon attacking U.S. and international forcesin Afghanistan) harbor no ill will toward it.Little wonder, then, that the Pakistani Armyprefers to stay out. Yet let's suspend our disbelieffor a moment and imagine that the militarychanges course and carries out Washington'swishes. What would happen?

First, militants would not simply disappear.They would move elsewhere. Some may wellbe forced into Afghanistan, where U.S. firepowerwould be waiting for them. Many others,however, would pour into neighboringtribal areas, which have not been stabilizeddespite the best efforts of previous army operations.Consider that in the Mohmand tribal agency,more than 50 heavily armed militants recentlyattacked a security checkpoint, killing orwounding more than a dozen Pakistani paramilitarytroops. The last thing Pakistan needsis a fresh inflow of the world's most viciousterrorists into tribal regions already crawlingwith extremist factions -- or, following in thefootsteps of Mullah Omar (Quetta), KhalidSheikh Mohammad (Karachi), and Osama binLaden (Abbottabad), into the country's urbanareas.

Second, a North Waziristan operation wouldgalvanize and unite Pakistan's immense arrayof militant organizations. The Pakistani Talibanand other anti-government groups in thetribal belt would join their besieged Haqqaninetwork and Afghan Taliban brothers in takingup arms against Islamabad.

Meanwhile, militant groups in PunjabProvince -- which have dispatched scores offighters to Afghanistan in recent years -- couldreact to an army offensive against their ideologicalkin by waging retaliatory attacks. Crucially,these would be launched from Punjab --home to Pakistan's capital, military headquarters,and the majority of the 180-millionstrongpopulation. This all constitutes aformidable challenge for a Pakistani state thatis either unable or unwilling to quell the lessmultifaceted anti-government insurgency itfaces today.

In short, a North Waziristan operation wouldaccelerate Pakistan's destabilization. Impoverished,radicalizing, nuclear-armed Pakistanwould lurch closer to implosion -- a terrifyingprospect in what Washington already describesas the world's most dangerous nation,and a scenario that would jeopardize a U.S. interestmore crucial than any in Afghanistan:Pakistan's long-term stability.

If not North Waziristan, then what? Simple:Intensify countermilitancy efforts on theAfghanistan side of the Durand Line. In fact,recent developments suggest that militancyflares as much on that side of the porous borderas on the Pakistani side.

In the last few weeks alone, there have beenseveral incidents of Afghanistan-based militants-- driven out of Pakistan by army operationsseveral years back -- launching crossborder attacks into Pakistan's tribal areas andinto nearby Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province.In one case, 200 militants entered the tribalarea of Bajaur from the eastern Afghanprovince of Kunar, and fought Pakistani forcesfor several days.

Ultimately, America must accept a fact thatsuperpowers are reluctant to concede: Its abilityto shape strategic thinking in other countriesis limited. The United States cannotcompel Pakistan to eliminate militant organizationson its soil that, while a threat to America,are an asset for Pakistan. However, bywithdrawing its demand that Pakistani tanksroll into North Waziristan, Washington wouldmake a modest contribution toward keepingPakistan's bushfires of extremism from eruptinginto a raging conflagration.(Michael Kugelman is the South Asiaprogram associate at the Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars.)

"…A North Waziristan operationwould accelerate Pakistan'sdestabilization. Impoverished,radicalizing, nuclear-armedPakistan would lurch closer toimplosion -- a terrifyingprospect in what Washingtonalready describes as the world'smost dangerous nation…"

[ BY MICHAEL KUGELMAN ]